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Abstract: Evangelicals are generally considered culturally conservative
regarding issues like abortion or homosexuality and sometimes also
economically conservative regarding issues like tax reduction. But does this
image also apply to Dutch evangelicals who live in a secular environment in
which they constitute only a tiny fraction of the number of church members?
This article explores the political attitudes of Dutch evangelicals with the help
of two research questions: (1) Do Dutch evangelicals hold more conservative
political attitudes on economic and cultural issues than Catholics, mainline
Protestants and non-church members? and (2) Which decisive factors
determine the supposed conservatism among Dutch evangelicals as compared
to Catholics, mainline Protestants and non-church members? Analyses of
survey data show that Dutch evangelicals are indeed culturally conservative,
but more liberal in economic matters. In addition, results also show that their
cultural conservatism is related to their religious convictions, while their
economic attitudes are unrelated to religion.
INTRODUCTION
Evangelicals are generally seen as orthodox believers who also hold con-
servative political attitudes. This especially goes for the United States
where the bond between evangelicalism and the Republican Party has
become stronger since the 1980’s. Attracted by the conservative agenda
of the Republican Party, evangelicals are not only culturally conservative,
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especially in their opposition to abortion and homosexuality (cf., for
instance, Hunter 1984; Schmalzbauer 1993; Putnam and Campbell
2010, 370–373, 384–388), but also increasingly hold conservative atti-
tudes on economic issues. This kind of economic conservatism comes
forward, for instance, in their growing opposition to government interfer-
ence in the economy or their support for tax reduction (Deckman et al.
2016). However, while evangelicals’ conservative stances on cultural
issues like abortion and homosexuality seem part and parcel of their dis-
tinctive religious identity, there is evidence that this is less the case for
their conservative stance on economic issues. A recent comparison of
the political attitudes of evangelicals in the United States and Brazil not
only showed that Brazilian evangelicals are significantly less conservative
on economic issues than their American coreligionists, but this compari-
son also revealed that the attitudes of Brazilian evangelicals on economic
issues could not be predicted by their level of orthodoxy or level of reli-
gious commitment (McAdams and Lance 2013). These findings suggest
that the way in which religion affects the political attitudes of evangelicals
is in part dependent on the socio-cultural context they find themselves in.
In order to offer an additional illustration of how the political attitudes
of evangelicals may differ according to the socio-cultural context they find
themselves in, this study compares political attitudes of evangelicals with
the attitudes of mainline Christians and non-church members in the
context of the Netherlands. The Netherlands constitutes an interesting
context in this respect, because it ranks among the most secular countries
in the Western world with nowadays only a quarter of the population
reporting to be a member of a Christian denomination (Bernts and
Berghuijs 2016, 23; cf. also Reitsma et al. 2012). Such a secular
context is likely to affect the political attitudes of Dutch evangelicals.
For, as Norris and Inglehart (2004, 196–212) already showed, the
process of secularization has weakened the relationship between religion
and right-wing political orientations in most post-industrial societies,
except for the United States. Not only has such a weakened relationship
indeed been established for the Netherlands, but previous research has
also revealed that even in view of cultural issues, like abortion or euthana-
sia, Dutch Catholics and mainline Protestants have become more liberal
over time. Around 1995, Dutch Catholics and mainline Protestants had
even become as culturally progressive or liberal as non-church members
were (Scheepers, Peters, and Felling 2000), which prompted some
researchers to characterize these developments as a process of “cultural
homogenization” (Becker et al. 1995). Only between non-church
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members, Catholics, and mainline Protestants, on the one hand, and the
small proportion of orthodox Protestants, on the other, a cultural gap
persisted.
Contrary to the United States, then, in the Netherlands there is no strong
relationship between religion and conservative political attitudes; nor do
orthodox believers constitute such a large proportion of the total
number of Christians in Dutch society, although their relative number
has been increasing due to the massive disaffiliation among Catholics
and mainline Protestants.1 Dutch evangelicals thus find themselves in a
specific, very secular socio-cultural context although, as a result of the
fragmented political landscape of the Netherlands, they are not without
political influence. After the recent general elections, there are now
three Christian parties represented in Dutch parliament. The Christian
Democratic Party is the largest Christian party in the Netherlands. It has
19 of the 150 available seats in parliament and combines a conservative
economic agenda with also a more liberal stance on certain cultural
issues like, for instance, gay rights. With three seats in parliament, the
Reformed Political Party is the smallest Christian party. It combines a con-
servative position on issues of migration or the presence of Islam with a
conservative stance on issues like abortion, euthanasia, or homosexuality.
In between is the Christian Union. This political party has five seats in par-
liament and combines a liberal, leftist economic agenda with a conserva-
tive stance on pro-life issues and homosexuality. While the electorate of
the Christian Democratic Party mainly consists of mainline Protestants
and Catholics and the electorate of the Reformed Political Party of specific
segments of orthodox Protestantism, the Christian Union is most popular
among evangelicals.
This specific background makes it interesting, we propose, to compare
political attitudes of Dutch evangelicals with those of mainline Christians
and non-church members and to examine to what extent their attitudes are
really determined by their religious identity. Therefore, the following
research questions are addressed in this study: (1) Do Dutch evangelicals
hold more conservative political attitudes on economic and cultural issues
than Catholics, mainline Protestants, and non-church members? and (2)
Which decisive factors determine the supposed conservatism among
Dutch evangelicals as compared to Catholics, mainline Protestants, and
non-church members? By answering these questions, we intend to gain
more insight in the way a very specific religious group, which is generally
known as conservative and reactionary (cf. for instance, McGrath 1995;
Boersema 2005; Stanley 2013), relates its religious convictions to
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certain political attitudes in the context of a modern, secular society like
the Netherlands. Thus, we aim to fill a lacuna in previous knowledge,
by adding insights on the political attitudes of evangelicals in a secular
country.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
We address both research questions by deriving several hypotheses from
previous theoretical insights, which we, subsequently, test. Our first
hypothesis relates to the first research question and regards the conserva-
tism of evangelicals concerning economic and cultural issues.
Conservatism is actually an ambiguous label. It concerns the appreciation
of individual freedom, but this appreciation differs for the economic and
the cultural domain (Felling and Peters 1984; Middendorp 1991;
Scheepers, Peters, and Felling 2000). Within the economic domain, a con-
servative position entails a positive appreciation of individual freedom.
This political stance is, for instance, indicated by support for the free-
market system, support for tax reduction or by opposition to government
interference to stimulate individual entrepreneurship and economic
growth. From a conservative view it is, furthermore, acknowledged that
all of this may result in socio-economic inequality. However, this socio-
economic inequality is considered to be an inevitable by-product of eco-
nomic growth and thus a conservative position in the economic domain is
also accompanied by a critical stance toward the provision of social ser-
vices to alleviate poverty as well as by a critical view on the government’s
responsibility to reduce income differences (Felling and Peters 1986; cf.
also, Deckman et al. 2016). Within the cultural domain, in contrast, con-
servatism relates to moral conservatism and actually boils down to support
for the restriction of individual freedom. This political stance is, for
instance, indicated by support for the restriction of civil liberties like the
freedom of speech, by opposition to abortion, euthanasia, and suicide
(so-called pro-life issues), as well as by the rejection of homosexual rela-
tionships and by a traditional view on the family as the only legitimate way
of cohabitating (Becker et al. 1995). Now, as we will explain in more
detail in the method section, in order to study the political attitudes of
Dutch evangelicals we used existing, and in the Netherlands widely
used, measures originally designed by the Dutch political scientist
Middendorp (1991). As a result, we focus on attitudes toward the reduc-
tion of income differences as far as the economic domain is concerned,
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while we focus on attitudes toward pro-life issues and homosexual rela-
tionships when it comes to the cultural domain.
But do we expect to find differences in political attitudes between evan-
gelicals, mainline Christians, and non-church members for both the eco-
nomic and the cultural domain? Previous research is far from conclusive
when it comes to the relationship between evangelicalism and cultural
and especially economic conservatism. Deckman et al. (2016) have
recently shown that American evangelicals have become more conserva-
tive over time in both the cultural and the economic domain. But this
picture is different for Brazilian evangelicals, who are as conservative as
their American coreligionists on cultural issues but not on economic
issues (McAdams and Lance 2013). This difference has also been found
between American and Canadian evangelicals (Bean 2014a; 2014b).
Furthermore, Deckman et al. (2016) also explained that the growing eco-
nomic conservatism among American evangelicals is a relatively recent
phenomenon, related to the emergence of the Tea Party over the past
decade. However, there is no such thing as a “natural affinity” between
evangelicalism and right-wing politics or the moral majority. Swartz
(2012) pointed out that during the 1960s and 1970s, a substantial
number of evangelicals even supported the Democratic Party and a
more leftist political agenda.
When it comes to the Netherlands, previous research has only estab-
lished a link between religion and cultural conservatism, but no clear
link between religion and economic conservatism. Economic conserva-
tism, Scheepers, Peters, and Felling (2000, 144) found, is particularly
shaped by social class and education not by religious affiliation. In addi-
tion, the study of Stoffels (1990, 104–106), which is the only empirical
study into the values and attitudes of Dutch evangelicals to date, even
showed that evangelicals are slightly more liberal in their view on eco-
nomic issues, like the reduction of income differences, compared to the
Dutch population, while they are indeed far more conservative in their
views on pro-life issues and homosexuality. Apart from these research
results, in the Netherlands there is also no general negative perception
of the welfare state as merely entailing support for the “underserving”
poor. Such an anti-welfare state sentiment does prevail in the United
States and is an important determinant, Bean (2014a, 112–132) argues,
for the economic conservatism of American evangelicals who perceive
government aid to the poor as a decline of religion’s public role and as
a denial of accountable individualism. In the Netherlands, in contrast,
the rapid expansion of the welfare state after the Second World War is
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seen as an important expression of state sponsored, collective solidarity
with traditionally only a marginal role for charitable organizations and
churches. Although from the mid-1980’s onward there has been a
gradual shift from an emphasis on collective solidarity to individual
responsibility, there is still a general consensus that the state should guar-
antee a social minimum for those who are in real need (Van Oorschot
2006). This more positive appreciation of the welfare state as, at the
bottom line, a matter of solidarity with the (real) poor, is similar to the
way the welfare state is perceived in Canada where this more positive
appreciation, as Bean (2014a; 2014b) shows, urges evangelicals to take
up their religious responsibilities toward the poor. Following these
insight and research findings, we propose that differences between the
political attitudes of evangelicals and other religious and non-religious
groups in the Netherlands, will specifically relate to the cultural domain
and especially to those moral issues where religion, both in the United
States (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 384–395) and the Netherlands
(Scheepers, Peters, and Felling 2000, 155), traditionally matters most:
i.e., abortion and homosexuality. Hence, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Evangelicals will hold more conservative views on pro-
life issues and homosexual relationships as compared to Catholics,
mainline Protestants and non-church members, but they will not hold
more conservative views on the reduction of income differences.
Regarding our second research question, we test four additional hypoth-
eses based on two theoretical perspectives. In order to account for the
assumed conservatism among Dutch evangelicals, we first adopt a social-
ization-theoretical perspective and focus on the family as the primary
socialization context. The importance of the family in view of the trans-
mission of religious as well as political convictions is well established
(Troll and Bengtson 1979). When it comes to religion, research has con-
vincingly shown that the religious commitment of parents positively
affects the religiosity of their children (cf. for instance, Hoge and
Petrillo 1978; Hunsberger and Brown 1984; Myers 1996, and for the
Dutch context, Andree 1983; Vermeer, Janssen, and de Hart 2011).
This relationship is usually that strong, that being raised by religious
parents in a religious family environment can be considered a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition for the child’s religious commitment in
later life. However, parents do not only transmit their religious convictions
to their children, but their political convictions as well. For the
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Netherlands, Need (1997) has shown that children mostly follow the polit-
ical preferences of their parents, also in their voting behavior. In addition,
she has also shown that the religious background of parents plays a role
here as well: the religious background of parents affects their own
voting behavior, which, subsequently, affects the voting behavior of
their children. Thus, she detected an indirect, religious and intergenera-
tional effect on voting behavior, which appeared to be strongest among
orthodox Protestants. A similar, indirect effect was found by Volleberg,
Iedema, and Raaijmakers (1999) in a longitudinal study into the transmis-
sion of conservative attitudes among Dutch adolescents and their parents.
Their study revealed that parents who regularly attend church also hold
more conservative attitudes concerning alternative forms of cohabitation,
like homosexual relationships, which in turn endorses a similar conserva-
tive stance among their children. Thus, we believe it is plausible to
assume, that there is a relationship between being socialized in a religious
family and holding conservative political attitudes on certain cultural
issues, especially among more orthodox Christians like evangelicals.
Furthermore, research into religious socialization has also shown that
not all religious activities are equally important here. Children are more
likely to adopt the religion of their parents and to maintain their religious
commitment in later life, if they were socialized in a family in which
church attendance, prayer, or Bible readings were regular religious
activities. In contrast, parents who were just nominal church members,
or who only discussed religious matters with their children, are signifi-
cantly less successful in transmitting their religious identity on to their
children (Hoge and Petrillo 1978; de Hart 1990; Vermeer, Janssen, and
de Hart 2011). Together with the view that processes of religious social-
ization may also affect one’s political attitudes, these insights result in the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Evangelicals who grew up in an overt religious family
environment will hold more conservative views on pro-life issues and
homosexual relationships, but they will not hold more conservative
views on the reduction of income differences.
Our second theoretical perspective is the subcultural identity theory of
religious strength, advanced by Smith (1998). This theory consists of a
number of propositions Smith uses to explain the strength and vitality
of evangelicalism in the United States. At the core of this subcultural iden-
tity theory is an alternative appreciation of cultural and religious plurality.
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In the 1960s and 1970s of the previous century, plurality was considered a
threat to religion. It was seen as one of the major causes of secularization,
since plurality results in the loss of an overarching religious plausibility
structure, as Berger (1973) explained in one of his early works on secula-
rization. This line of reasoning is turned upside down by Smith. Within the
framework of his subcultural identity theory, cultural and religious plural-
ity is no longer seen as a threat, but as an opportunity: it offers religious
groups the opportunity to distinguish themselves from other groups and to
sharpen their own religious identity. Subcultural identity theory thus is
clearly indebted to social identity theory, which states that social groups
construct their own identity on the basis of a comparison with positive
and negative ‘reference groups’ (cf. Tajfel 1981; 1982). A culturally and
religiously plural environment, which is one of the hallmarks of modern
society, in this way enhances the “(…) sociological capacity of religions
to survive and thrive in the modern world — particularly those which
are well-equipped culturally to construct distinctive subcultural identities”
(Smith 1998, 111). This also explains the relative success of evangelical-
ism, according to Smith. Evangelical congregations are able, far better
than mainline denominations, to construct and articulate a subcultural
identity, which separates them from other religious groups and reinforces
their internal strength.
On the basis of subcultural identity theory, we test four more hypothe-
ses. The first hypothesis relates to two important characteristics of evan-
gelicalism: an emphasis on the absolute authority of the Bible and an
emphasis on the cross of Christ as the necessary and sufficient basis of
salvation (McGrath 1995, 59–68). Although evangelicalism is not a
well-defined religious movement, the belief that the Bible contains the
literal word of God and that salvation is only possible through the redemp-
tive work of Jesus Christ is widespread among evangelicals (cf. for
instance, Kellstedt and Smidt 1991; Vellenga 1991, 9–11). Both beliefs
can be considered important evangelical identity markers, which also
give present-day Dutch evangelicals a distinctive subcultural identity.
Today, only a small proportion of the Dutch, viz. 14%, believes that the
Bible contains the word of God, while only 23% believes that Jesus
Christ is the son of God (Bernts and Berghuijs 2016, 67–68, 220).
Hence, Dutch evangelicals appear to be far more orthodox in their view
on the Bible and the redemptive work of Jesus Christ as compared to
the overall Dutch population and even compared to Catholics and mainline
Protestants. Holding these more orthodox views thus is a distinctive char-
acteristic of Dutch evangelicals. Since these views are found to be
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important predictors for conservative attitudes in the cultural domain
among American evangelicals (McAdams and Lance 2013), we propose
with regard to their Dutch counterparts that:
Hypothesis 3: Evangelicals who believe that the Bible contains the
literal word of God or that salvation is only possible through Christ
will hold more conservative views on pro-life issues and homosexual
relationships, but they will not hold more conservative views on the
reduction of income differences.
However, given the fact that the aforementioned evangelical identity
markers most clearly distinguish evangelicals from Catholics and mainline
Protestants (Bernts and Berghuijs 2016, 67–68), we additionally assume
that especially these specific beliefs explain why evangelicals are more
culturally conservative than Catholics and mainline Protestants. Thus,
we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: The belief that the Bible contains the literal word of God
or that salvation is only possible through Christ has a stronger effect on
the cultural conservativism of evangelicals than on the cultural
conservatism of Catholics and mainline Protestants.
In the case of evangelicalism, a subcultural identity not only relates to
upholding certain distinctive beliefs, but it also involves an orientation
toward certain parachurch organizations. Smith (1998; cf. also, Stanley
2013, 29–36) shows that the emergence and success of the evangelical
movement in the United States is also partly due to a certain degree of
institutionalization, like: the establishment of theological seminaries, pub-
lishing houses, newspapers, and broadcasting companies. Such a process
of institutionalization has also been important in the Netherlands for the
emergence and continuation of the evangelical movement. Especially
the establishment of the Evangelical Broadcasting Organization in 1967
turned out to be a milestone in the history of Dutch evangelicalism
(Boersema 2005). In this way, a subcultural network of evangelical orga-
nizations, or an evangelical “pillar,” arose in the Netherlands, which was
important in endorsing and spreading evangelical beliefs. A network of
subcultural organizations thus may be important to prevent the accommo-
dation to the surrounding culture and to stimulate subcultural persistence
(Hippe and Lucardie 1998). On the basis of these insights we hypothesize
that:
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Hypothesis 5: Evangelicals who are a member of the Evangelical
Broadcasting organization or who read a Christian newspaper will
hold more conservative views on pro-life issues and homosexual
relationships, but they will not hold more conservative views on the
reduction of income differences.
Our final hypothesis concerns the idea that the aforementioned hypoth-
eses of having a distinctive subcultural identity may be muted by socio-
economic status. Having a higher education, a higher income or even a
paid job could mean that evangelicals have been exposed to the secularism
and liberalism of the dominant culture at the cost of their support for the
conservative ideology of their own subculture. This idea is tested by
Schmalzbauer (1993) who reported mixed results. With regard to the atti-
tude toward homosexuality, evangelicals with a higher socio-economic
status, the so-called “new class” evangelicals, were as conservative as
lower class evangelicals. But with respect to a pro-life issue like abortion,
Schmalzbauer indeed found that evangelicals with a higher socio-eco-
nomic status were less conservative. More recently, Deckman et al.
(2016) also pointed at the influence of personal economic circumstances,
which prompted lower class evangelicals to take a less conservative stance
when it comes to government interference in the economy. Thus, it is
plausible to propose that a higher socio-economic status mitigates the
power of a religious subculture to shape political attitudes. Therefore,
our final hypothesis reads:
Hypothesis 6: Evangelicals with a higher socio-economic status will
hold less conservative attitudes on pro-life issues, homosexual
relationships as well as on the reduction of income differences.
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
Sample
In order to test our hypotheses, we compare data from two subpopulations:
evangelicals and respondents from a previously conducted national
survey. The evangelical respondents were gathered by way of purposive
sampling. In the Netherlands, citizen registries do not contain information
on religious affiliation nor are all evangelical congregations united under a
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single denominational umbrella, which makes random sampling of evan-
gelicals impossible. As an instance of purposive sampling, we first con-
ducted an extensive web search and specifically looked for large
thriving congregations, serving around 1000 attendees or more in an
average week, whose mission statements are in line with the six fundamen-
tal convictions of evangelicalism listed by McGrath (1995, 55–66): ascrib-
ing absolute authority to Scripture, affirming the majesty of Jesus Christ,
recognizing the work of the Holy Spirit, stressing the need for personal
conversion, giving priority to evangelism and being committed to the
Christian community. In addition, we also examined whether these con-
gregations exhibit such specific features like: no traditional church build-
ing, no traditional liturgy, services consisting mainly of singing songs of
praise and a lengthy sermon, the use of pop/rock music et cetera. In the
autumn of 2014, we had identified 12 congregations fitting our profile
spread across the Netherlands except for the Southern provinces which
are predominantly Catholic. Next we contacted the leadership of these
congregations and asked if they were willing to participate in our research
by distributing a link to an online questionnaire among their membership
and/or attendees of 18 years or older. Eventually, six congregations partic-
ipated and distributed this link during the period November 2014 –
January 2015. This resulted in a total of 584 evangelical respondents
who filled in our online questionnaire.2 However, since we used a non-
probabilistic sampling method (purposive sampling), we cannot tell to
what extent this sample is representative for the total population of evan-
gelicals in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, a comparison of the demo-
graphic profiles of the evangelicals in our sample and those that
participated in the study of Stoffels (1990), until today the only available
large-scale quantitative study into the beliefs and values of evangelicals
conducted in the Netherlands, hardly reveals any differences and even
confirms the relatively high socioeconomic status of the evangelicals in
our sample in terms of education and to a lesser extent of income.
To be able to compare these evangelical respondents to Catholics, main-
line Protestants, and non-church members, we also distributed the link to
our online questionnaire among a representative sample of the Dutch pop-
ulation. This sample was drawn in 2011 in view of the “Religion in Dutch
society 2011–2012” survey with previous waves of data collection in
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 (cf. Eisinga et al. 2012). In
January 2015, a letter of invitation to participate in our research was
sent to 918 respondents who had stated in 2011–2012 that they were
willing to participate in future research. This resulted in a total of 336
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completed questionnaires, while 39 letters were sent back to us because
the address was wrong or the respondent had deceased. In view of this
response rate of 36.6%, we checked to what extent this new sample is
(still) comparable to the original sample. A comparison of such general
characteristics as education, marital status and income, characteristics
which in the Netherlands have also been found to relate to conservative
political attitudes (Vollebergh, Iedema, and Meeus 1997), shows that
this is not entirely the case. Chi-square tests reveal that our new panel con-
tains less lower educated and more higher educated respondents, more
married respondents and less singles as well as less respondents in the
lower income category. Thus, we decided to include marital status as a
control variable in our study next to gender and age, while education
and income are already included to test our sixth hypothesis.3
Dependent Variables: Political Attitudes
We examine attitudes about one issue concerning the economic domain,
i.e., the reduction of income differences, and two issues concerning the
cultural domain: pro-life issues and homosexual relationships. We mea-
sured these attitudes using previously validated, and in the Netherlands
widely used, instruments (Felling and Peters 1984; 1986; Middendorp
1991, 98–103; cf. also, Eisinga et al. 2012, 44–48).
The attitude toward the reduction of income differences is measured
with three questions. The first question inquires after the respondents’ atti-
tude toward class differences and the role of trade unions in this respect
and comprises four items, like: “Trade unions have to adopt a much
harder line if they really are to promote workers’ interests” or
“Differences between classes ought to be smaller than they are at
present.” The original five point response scale was collapsed into three
categories: (1) agree, (2) agree/disagree, and (3) disagree. The second
question concerns the respondents’ opinions regarding the reduction of
income differences. Response categories were (1) income differences
should decrease, (2) should stay the same, and (3) should increase. The
third question inquires after the respondents’ opinions regarding active
government interference in order to reduce income differences.
Response categories were (1) in favor, (2) no opinion, and (3) against.
On the basis of factor analysis one item was removed, resulting in a
final five item scale to assess the respondents’ attitudes toward the reduc-
tion of income differences (explained variance 53.6%, Cronbach’s alpha
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0.77). For each respondent with scores on all five items an overall score
was calculated by counting all conservative responses. With regard to
income differences, then, a conservative attitude means that one is not
in favor of reducing class differences, that one thinks that income differ-
ences should increase, and that the government should not interfere in
order to reduce income differences. Thus, the scale for the attitude
toward income differences runs from (0) not a single conservative
answer to (5) all answers are conservative.
The attitudes toward pro-life issues were measured with five questions
concerning the following issues: family planning, abortion, active eutha-
nasia, and suicide (Cronbach’s alpha 0.74). For example, the question
with regard to family planning read: “A married couple chooses to
have no children even though there are no medical reasons why they
should not. Can you accept such an attitude or do you consider this
unacceptable?” Response categories were (1) acceptable, (2) unaccept-
able, and (3) no opinion. For each respondent with scores on all five
questions, an overall score was calculated by counting all conservative
answers; i.e., the times a respondent indicates that the respective
issues are unacceptable. Thus, the scale for the attitude toward pro-life
issues runs from (0) all issues are acceptable to (5) all issues are
unacceptable.
Finally, the attitude toward homosexual relationships was assessed by
asking: “Do you consider the following way of cohabitation acceptable
or not: living together as a homosexual with a steady partner?”
Respondents could answer on a scale ranging from (1) very acceptable
to (5) very unacceptable.
Independent Variable: Religious Affiliation
Respondents of the evangelical subpopulation were offered a list of nine
evangelical congregations and were asked if they consider themselves to
be a member of one of these congregations. If so, they were labelled evan-
gelical. Respondents of the sample of the Dutch population were asked if
they consider themselves to be a member of a Christian denomination and,
if so, if they could indicate their religious affiliation on a list of 11
Christian denominations. Respondents who indicated to be a member of
an evangelical congregation were also labelled evangelical, while the
other respondents, after the remaining 10 denominations were collapsed
into three categories, were labelled Catholic, mainline Protestant, and
128 Vermeer and Scheepers
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048317000566
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteitsbibliotheek Nijmegen, on 20 May 2019 at 12:59:25, subject to the Cambridge
orthodox Protestant.4 Respondents of the sample of Dutch population who
indicated to be a non-church member were labelled none.
Independent Variables: Family Religious Socialization
In order to assess if the respondents were raised in an overt religious
family environment, nine questions were used. Respondents could indicate
if they were raised in a religious way and if a religious upbringing was
important at home on a scale ranging from (1) not at all/very unimportant
to (5) very religious/very important. Next to these questions another set of
five questions inquired after religious practices taking place in the family
context. Respondents could indicate their level of juvenile church atten-
dance as well as the level of church attendance of their father and
mother when they were 12 to 15 years old on a scale ranging from (1)
almost never to (4) about once a week. In addition, respondents could
also indicate if prayer and Bible reading were regular activities in their
homes on a scale ranging from (1) never to (7) several times a day.
Finally, it was assessed if both parents were evangelicals when the respon-
dents were 12 to 15 years and if the respondents were deliberately, i.e., for
religious reasons, sent to a religiously affiliated, secondary school by their
parents.5
Independent Variables: Evangelical Subcultural Identity
The respondents’ evangelical subcultural identity relates to four aspects:
having a literal understanding of the Bible, having a mono-religious orien-
tation, reading a Christian newspaper, and membership of an evangelical
broadcasting company. In order to assess the respondents’ view on the
Bible, they were offered four statements concerning the Bible and were
asked with which statement they agreed most. If respondents agreed
most with the statement “From cover to cover the Bible contains the
infallible word of God,” respondents were labelled as having a literal
understanding of the Bible (Stoffels 1990, 151). The respondents’
mono-religious orientation was measured with help of a scale comprising
three items like: “Only in Christianity do people have access to true salva-
tion” (Vermeer and Van der Ven 2004). Response categories ran from (1)
strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. For each respondent, a mean score
for all three items was calculated (Cronbach’s alpha 0.94). Apart from
assessing these beliefs, we also asked if the respondents read one of the
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three major Dutch Christian newspapers and if they are a member of the
Evangelical Broadcasting Organization.
Independent Variables: Socioeconomic Status
Socio-economic status refers to employment status, income and education.
Employment status was measured with the help of the question: “Do you
have a paid job at the moment?” Response categories were (0) no and (1)
yes. Income regards the gross family income and was collapsed into the
categories (1) lower income (2.000 Euro or less), (2) middle income
(between 2.000 and 2.500 Euro), and (3) higher income (2.500 Euro or
more). Education concerns the highest education completed and was col-
lapsed into three categories (1) lower education (highest education is lower
vocational school), (2) middle education (from lower secondary school to
secondary vocational school), and (3) higher education (from O levels to
PhD or doctorate).
Control Variables
Gender relates to (0) male and (1) female. Age is 2014 minus the respon-
dent’s year of birth. Marital status relates to (1) married, (2) unmarried/
single, (3) living together, (4) widow/widower, and (5) divorced. The
descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 4 in the
Appendix.
RESULTS
Mean Scores Political Attitudes
Table 1 compares the political attitudes of evangelicals with the attitudes
of Catholics, mainline Protestants, and non-church members (nones).
When it comes to the economic issue of the reduction of income differ-
ences, there are no significant differences between the four groups
(F (3, 691) = 0.399, p > 0.05). None of the groups thinks that income dif-
ferences should not be reduced with evangelicals even being the most in
favor of reducing income differences. However, strong differences come
forward with regard to pro-life issues and the acceptance of homosexual
relationships. With regard to pro-life issues, evangelicals clearly are the
most conservative. Evangelicals consider these issues (i.e., family
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planning, abortion, active euthanasia, and suicide) significantly more
unacceptable than Catholics, mainline Protestants and nones (F (3, 701)
= 129.957, p < 0.001), although also mainline Protestants differ signifi-
cantly from the nones in this respect. This also goes for the acceptance
of homosexual relationships. Again, evangelicals are the most conserva-
tive and they differ significantly from all other groups, but also mainline
Protestants differ significantly from the nones when it comes to the accep-
tance of homosexual relationships (F (3, 644) = 110.884, p < 0.001).
These results confirm hypothesis 1. Evangelicals do indeed hold more
conservative views than Catholics, mainline Protestants, and non-church
members on such cultural matters as pro-life issues and homosexual rela-
tionships, while they are not more conservative concerning the economic
issue of the reduction of income differences. Still, one interesting aspect of
Table 1 should not be left unnoticed. As the standard deviations for pro-
life issues (1.35) and homosexual relationships (1.26) indicate, the evan-
gelicals participating in our study are far from unanimous with regard to
these matters.
Bivariate Analyses
Our second research question inquires after the factors that are substan-
tially related to the conservatism of evangelicals as compared to
Catholics, mainline Protestants, and non-church members. To address
this question we first have a look at the bivariate associations between
Table 1. Means of political attitudes concerning income differences, freedom of
speech, pro-life issues and homosexual relationships for Catholics, mainline
Protestants, Evangelicals, and nones (SD)
Catholics
Mainline
Protestants Evangelicals Nones Eta
Income differences (0–5) 0.87 1.03 0.82 0.88 0.04
(1.18) (1.35) (1.09) (1.27)
Pro-life issues (0–5) 0.35 1.10 2.11 0.23 0.60*
(0.57) (1.30) (1.35) (0.63)
Homosexual
relationships (1–5)
1.76 2.07 3.17 1.44 0.59*
(0.77) (0.98) (1.26) (0.81)
*p < 0.001.
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the three political attitudes we distinguish and the aforementioned inde-
pendent and control variables (cf. Table 2).
When it comes to the attitude concerning the reduction of income dif-
ferences, our results indicate that this conservative economic attitude is
unrelated to religion. We only find weak but significant associations
between this attitude and socio-economic factors (i.e., employment
status, education, and income), gender, and marital status. This is
completely in line with earlier findings in the Netherlands, which
showed that there is hardly a link between religion and economic conser-
vatism (cf. for instance, Scheepers, Peters, and Felling 2000). Our results
thus once again confirm that in the Netherlands economic conservatism is
not a matter of religion but a matter of socio-economic status.
But this is different with regard to the political attitudes concerning the
cultural domain. When it comes to the attitude toward pro-life issues, all
religious factors are related to this attitude with the associations between
this attitude and having a literal understanding of the Bible and a mono-
religious orientation even being fairly strong. Next to an association
with education, there are also associations with age, younger respondents
are less conservative in this regard, and marital status. The attitude toward
homosexual relationships again is related to almost all religious factors
except for reading a Christian newspaper. Also the aforementioned
aspects of an evangelical subcultural identity (i.e., having a literal under-
standing of the Bible and a mono-religious orientation) again are related
most strongly to this attitude. Furthermore, the attitude toward homosexual
relationships is also weakly related to income, age, with younger respon-
dents again being less conservative in this regard, and marital status.
Most of the religious, socio-economic, and demographic factors we dis-
tinguish are related to the cultural conservatism of our respondents. But
which factors, then, are most decisive in explaining the cultural conserva-
tism among the evangelicals participating in our study as compared to
Dutch Catholics, mainline Protestants, and non-church members? This
second research question is addressed below with the help of multivariate
analyses.
Multivariate Analyses
In order to identify the most decisive determinants for the conservatism
among our evangelical respondents as compared to our Catholic, mainline
Protestant, and non-religious respondents, we conduct a stepwise linear
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regression analysis for each political attitude. In the analysis regarding the
attitude on income differences, we estimate two models; and in the anal-
yses regarding the attitudes on pro-life issues and homosexual relation-
ships we estimate four models. In a first model, we only estimate the
effect of religious affiliation. Like Table 1, this model shows to what
extent Catholics, mainline Protestants, and evangelicals hold more conser-
vative attitudes than non-church members (the reference category). In a
second model, we estimate the effect of religious affiliation again, but
now add all other independent and control variables to the equation. If
these additional variables have a significant effect on the political attitude
in question and at the same time reduce the effect of being evangelical, it
is possible to conclude that these independent variables explain (away) the
conservatism among evangelicals (Davis 1985, 40). With regard to the
attitudes concerning pro-life issues and homosexual relationships, two
sets of additional variables are added to the equation. In a third model,
interaction terms for religious affiliation and biblical literalism are
Table 2. Correlations between four sets of variables and attitudes concerning








Religious affiliation 0.04 0.60*** 0.59***
Raised in religious way −0.00 0.33*** 0.29***
Religious education important 0.01 0.34*** 0.30***
Juvenile church attendance resp. 0.03 0.34*** 0.30***
Church att. father resp. 12–15 yr. 0.01 0.29*** 0.23***
Church att. mother resp. 12–15 yr. 0.01 0.29*** 0.23***
Prayer at home −0.03 0.36*** 0.30***
Bible reading at home 0.02 0.47*** 0.40***
Parents evang. resp. 12–15 yr. 0.04 0.16*** 0.15***
Sent to religious school 0.05 0.32*** 0.24***
Bible literal word of God 0.03 0.51*** 0.59***
Mono-religious orientation −0.01 0.63*** 0.66***
Reads Christ. newspaper 0.03 0.18*** 0.06
Member evangelical broadcasting corp. 0.02 0.36*** 0.31***
Employment status 0.12** 0.03 0.05
Education 0.14** 0.14** 0.07
Income 0.16** 0.07 0.18***
Gender 0.17*** 0.02 0.00
Age −0.01 −0.12** −0.15***
Marital status 0.14* 0.20*** 0.22***
*p < 0.050; **p < 0.010; ***p < 0.001.
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added; and in a fourth model, interaction terms for religious affiliation and
having a mono-religious orientation. Adding these interactions terms to
the equation enables us to ascertain if these distinctive beliefs indeed
have a stronger effect among evangelicals than among Catholics and
mainline Protestants, as predicted by our fourth hypothesis.
The results of the regression analyses are displayed in Table 3. With
regard to the attitude toward the economic issue of the reduction of
income differences, the results again confirm our first hypothesis.
Model 1 shows that religious affiliates are not more conservative on eco-
nomic issues than non-church members. Furthermore, as Model 2 shows,
resistance against the reduction of income differences is mainly driven by
socio-economic factors, i.e., having a higher income, a higher education,
and having a paid job, as well as by demographic factors, being male and
being a widow/widower, although respondents who attended church as
youths are also more conservative in this respect.
However, with respect to the conservative attitude of evangelicals
toward pro-life issues religious factors do play an important role. Model
1 again confirms our first hypothesis: in view of pro-life issues, evangel-
icals are significantly more conservative than non-church members,
although also mainline Protestants are more conservative than non-
church members in this respect. Only Catholics are not more conservative
than the nones. In addition, and in line with hypothesis 3, Model 2 also
shows that having a literal understanding of the Bible and a mono-religious
orientation strongly endorses a conservative attitude concerning pro-life
issues. Next to these factors, two factors concerning family religious social-
ization, i.e., Bible reading at home and being deliberately sent to a reli-
giously affiliated school, also affect the conservatism of evangelicals in
view of pro-life issues, which is partial support for hypothesis 2. Finally,
Model 2 also offers partial support for hypothesis 5, since having a paid
job is indeed a negative predictor for holding conservative views on pro-
life issues. Thus, the conservatism of evangelicals with regard to pro-life
issues can be explained in terms of the influence of five factors, which
completely reduce the effect of religious affiliation to non-significance.
But evangelicals are not in every respect unique in this. Although Model
3 shows that biblical literalism has a stronger effect on a conservative atti-
tude toward pro-life issues among evangelicals than among Catholics and
mainline Protestants, the differences are not statistically significant. Only
the effect of having a mono-religious orientation is significantly stronger
among evangelicals in this respect, but this also goes for mainline
Protestants. These results barely support hypothesis 4.
134 Vermeer and Scheepers
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048317000566
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteitsbibliotheek Nijmegen, on 20 May 2019 at 12:59:25, subject to the Cambridge
Table 3. Stepwise OLS regression analyses for attitudes concerning income differences, pro-life issues and homosexual
relationships (β)
Income differences Pro-life issues Homosexual relationships
M1 M2 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Religious affiliation
(ref. = none)
Catholic 0.02 0.01 0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.05 0.05 0.00 −0.04 0.04
Mainline
Protestant
0.05 0.06 0.14*** −0.01 0.03 0.10* 0.10* −0.02 −0.03 0.04
Evangelical 0.01 −0.02 0.62*** 0.07 0.13 0.23** 0.61*** 0.03 0.04 0.12
Raised in religious way −0.12 −0.04 −0.04 −0.05 −0.06 −0.07 −0.06
Religious education
important
0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.12
Juvenile church
attendance resp.
0.22** 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.08
Church att. father
resp. 12–15 yr.
−0.08 −0.11 −0.11 −0.11 −0.11 −0.12 −0.11
Church att. mother
resp. 12–15 yr.
−0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01
Prayer at home −0.15 0.02 0.02 0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
Bible reading at home −0.01 0.11* 0.11* 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02
Parents evang.
resp. 12–15 yr.
0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Sent to religious school 0.04 0.11** 0.11* 0.11** 0.07* 0.07 0.07*
Bible literal word of
God
0.01 0.27*** 0.01 0.25 0.35*** 0.27 0.34***
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−0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05
Member evangelical
broadcasting corp.
0.02 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00
Employment status
(1 = has a job)
0.15** −0.07* −0.07* −0.07* −0.07* −0.08 −0.07*
Family income (ref. =
higher)
Lower −0.05 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Middle −0.11* −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Education (ref. =
higher)
Lower −0.10* −0.05 −0.04 −0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
Middle −0.12** 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
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Income differences Pro-life issues Homosexual relationships
M1 M2 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Age 0.06 −0.06 −0.07 −0.05 −0.12** −0.12** −0.11**
Marital status (ref. =
married)
Single 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.05
Living together 0.07 −0.05 −0.05 −0.03 −0.07* −0.07* −0.06
Widow/widower 0.09* −0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Divorced 0.01 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
R2 adj. −0.00 0.08 0.33 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.33 0.56 0.56 0.56
N 569 569 575 575 575 575 526 526 526 526
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Religious factors are also important with regard to the attitude of evan-
gelicals toward homosexual relationships. Having a literal view on the
Bible and a mono-religious orientation are strong predictors for the rejec-
tion among evangelicals of homosexual relationships. This again supports
hypothesis 3, although these factors also explain the rejection of homosex-
ual relationships among mainline Protestants. Model 2 also offers some
support for our second hypothesis regarding the influence of family reli-
gious socialization. As it turns out, being deliberately sent to a religiously
affiliated school also drives a conservative stance toward homosexual rela-
tionships. However, and in line with hypothesis 5, having a paid job is
negatively related to a conservative attitude in this regard and this also
goes for age and marital status; i.e., younger people and those who are
living together consider homosexual relationships more acceptable.
Together these six factors completely reduce the effect of religious affili-
ation to non-significance, which suggest that these factors are the most
decisive determinants for the conservative stance toward homosexuality
among evangelicals. But contrary to hypothesis 4, evangelicals again
are not that unique in this, since Models 3 and 4 do not reveal any signifi-
cant interaction effect. Thus, biblical literalism and having a mono-reli-
gious orientation do not make evangelicals more conservative in view
of homosexual relationships than Catholics or mainline Protestants.
To sum up, our results largely support hypothesis 1. The evangelicals in
our study indeed hold more conservative attitudes on pro-life issues and
homosexual relationships than Catholics, mainline Protestants, and non-
church members, but they are not more economically conservative.
Hypothesis 2, in contrast, is barely supported by our findings. Most
aspects of a religious socialization in the family have no effect on the cul-
tural conservatism of evangelicals. Only Bible reading at home and being
sent to a religious school have a relatively weak effect on the conservative
stance of evangelicals on pro-life issues and homosexual relationships.
Hypothesis 3, on the other hand, is in large part supported by our
results. Biblical literalism and having a mono-religious orientation offer
a powerful explanation for the conservative stance of evangelicals
toward pro-life issues and homosexual relationships. But hypothesis 4,
we again have to reject. Although the effect of a mono-religious orienta-
tion on pro-life issues is stronger among evangelicals than among
Catholics, there is no significant difference between evangelicals and
mainline Protestants in this respect; nor are there statistically significant
differences between the three religious groups with regard to the effects
of biblical literalism. Also lacking is support for hypothesis 5, since the
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institutional aspects of an evangelical subcultural identity, like reading a
Christian newspaper or being a member of the Evangelical Broadcasting
organization, have no effect whatsoever on the conservatism of evangeli-
cals. Finally, our results do offer some support for hypothesis 6. Income
and education are not related to the conservatism of evangelicals, but
having a paid job is indeed a weak and negative determinant for their con-
servative attitudes on pro-life issues and homosexual relationships.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we compared political attitudes of evangelicals with those of
mainline Christians and non-church members, all living in the secular
context of the Netherlands. To do this, we addressed two interrelated
research questions: (1) Do Dutch evangelicals hold more conservative
political attitudes on economic and cultural issues than Catholics, mainline
Protestants, and non-church members? and (2) Which decisive factors
determine the supposed conservatism among Dutch evangelicals as
compared to Catholics, mainline Protestants, and non-church members?
With regard to the first question, our results show that the evangelicals
participating in our research are far more culturally conservative than
economically conservative. More so than Catholics, mainline
Protestants, and non-church members do evangelicals consider family
planning, abortion, active euthanasia, suicide, and homosexual relation-
ships unacceptable. But when it comes to their attitude concerning the
reduction of income differences, they do not differ from other groups
and even are somewhat more liberal in this respect. Thus, our evangelical
respondents combine a somewhat leftist view on the issue of income
inequality and the desirability of the reduction of income differences
with a conservative stance on certain moral issues. In this respect, these
Dutch evangelicals nicely fit the political profile of the Christian Union.
As we already mentioned in the introduction, the Christian Union is one
of the three Christian political parties in the Netherlands and is more
left of center, next to the more right wing Reformed Political Party, and
the right of center Christian Democratic Party. Not by accident, then,
with 53.1% voting for the Christian Union this party is also the most
popular political party among our evangelical respondents (Vermeer and
Scheepers 2017).
Our findings thus are in line with Swartz’s (2012) contention, that there
is no natural affinity between evangelicalism and right-wing politics. As
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we already mentioned above, such a relationship was not found among
Brazilian (McAdams and Lance 2013) nor among Canadian evangelicals
(Bean 2014a; 2014b) and it is also not present among the evangelicals we
studied. Consequently, the growing conservatism among American evan-
gelicals in both the cultural and especially the economic domain, that was
recently documented by Deckman et al. (2016), may be more typical for
the United States and may indeed by the result of the growing polarization
in American politics between the Democratic and the Republican Party
and of the emergence of the Tea Party, as Deckman et al. suggest. In con-
trast, in the politically plural context of the Netherlands, where such a
strong polarization between two political parties does not exist and parti-
sanship is traditionally low (Scheepers, Peters, and Felling 2000) and has
persisted to be low also after the turn of the century (Linssen et al. 2014),
partisan leanings may be less influential on the political attitudes of the
electorate and the conservatism of Dutch evangelicals may, therefore, be
confined to those moral issues where religion traditionally matters most:
i.e., pro-life and homosexuality. In this respect, it is also noteworthy
that the somewhat more liberal attitude of our evangelical respondents
toward the reduction of income differences is not informed by their reli-
gious background. This fits Smidt and Penning’s (1982) earlier findings,
that religion especially endorses a conservative stance with regard to those
issues that are perceived as being closely related to moral values.
Apparently, then, only when there is a close relationship between evangel-
icalism and partisan leanings, as is the case nowadays in the United States,
may the conservatism of evangelicals also relate to the economic domain
above and beyond the cultural domain.
Our second question inquires after the most decisive determinants of the
conservative attitudes of our evangelical respondents as compared to
Catholics, mainline Protestants, and non-church members. As we have
seen, religion does not matter much with regard to their stances toward
the reduction of income differences, but it does matter with regard to
their conservative attitudes toward pro-life issues and homosexuality.
That is to say, especially their religious convictions matter here.
Juvenile religious socialization experiences barely determine the cultural
conservatism of these Dutch evangelicals and nor do the more institutional
aspects of their subcultural identity. However, their biblical literalism and
mono-religious orientation appear to be powerful determinants of their
conservatism toward pro-life issues and homosexuality. The more these
evangelicals endorse a literalist view on the Bible and believe that salva-
tion can only be found in Jesus Christ, the more they hold conservative
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attitudes in this respect. In this regard, our evangelical respondents are
quite similar to their coreligionists in, for instance, the United States or
Brazil (McAdams and Lance 2013).
However, this rather strong effect of the religious convictions of our
evangelical respondents on the conservative attitudes they hold, is slightly
mitigated by employment status and in the case of their attitude toward
homosexuality also, and also more strongly, by age. Apparently,
younger evangelicals find homosexual relationship less unacceptable
than their older coreligionists. This could indicate a cohort effect.
Nowadays, younger evangelicals in the Netherlands are raised in a
socio-cultural context in which homosexuality is widely accepted (Van
den Akker, Van den Ploeg, and Scheepers 2013). This may have
shaped their views on homosexuality in a different direction than the
views of older evangelicals who were raised in a socio-cultural context
that was less friendly toward homosexuality. Such a difference between
older and younger evangelicals on the matter of homosexuality was, for
instance, also found by Pelz and Smidt (2015) in their study into genera-
tional differences among American evangelicals. With regard to pro-life
issues, however, such a distinction between older and younger evangeli-
cals does not come forward as age has no effect here. This could be
due to the fact that issues like euthanasia or abortion are still far more con-
troversial in Dutch society than homosexuality and that a cohort effect
thus is less likely to occur in view of the attitudes Dutch evangelicals
hold with regard to pro-life issues.
Still, notwithstanding these mitigating effects of employment status and
age, the cultural conservatism of our evangelical respondents is driven
most forcefully by their distinctive religious convictions. This is clearly
in line with subcultural identity theory (Smith 1998). But, contrary to
our expectations, we hardly found evidence that these distinctive beliefs
have a stronger effect on the cultural conservatism of evangelicals than
on the cultural conservatism of Catholics and mainline Protestants. Only
in case of pro-life issues does a mono-religious orientation more strongly
drive the attitudes of evangelicals in a conservative direction, but this
interaction effect was not found with regard to their attitude toward homo-
sexuality. It is hard to tell why this is the case. One explanation could be
that secularization has progressed that far in the Netherlands that those
who remain committed to their churches are now also the more orthodox
and firm believers. Consequently, having a literalist view on the Bible or
having a mono-religious orientation may nowadays be less typical for
Dutch evangelicals than we initially expected. Today these beliefs may
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have become hallmarks for church involvement as such and thus also
determinants of a conservative attitude toward pro-life issues and homo-
sexuality among a broader range of Christians than evangelicals alone.
Further research is needed to see if this explanation really holds.
NOTES
1. In 2015, 11.6% of the Dutch belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, 8.6% to the Protestant
Church in the Netherlands, which is the largest Protestant denomination in the Netherlands, 4.7%
belonged to one of the smaller and mostly orthodox Protestant churches, 7.7% belonged to a non-
Christian religion, and 67.8% had no religious affiliation (Bernts and Berghujis 2016, 23). Exact
figures of the number of evangelicals are not available. They are usually counted as belonging to
one of the smaller Protestant churches.
2. The following congregations participated in this study: Maranatha Ministries in Amsterdam, Church
of the Nazarene in Vlaardingen, Baptist Church “De Rank” in Utrecht, Free Baptist Community in
Groningen, Free Evangelization in Zwolle and Evangelical Church “De Pijler” in Lelystad.
3. The dataset and more detailed documentation of this survey are available at: www.doi.org/10.
17026/dans-xdh-6gb3.
4. Due to the small number of orthodox Protestants in our sample (N = 10; see also Table 4 in the
Appendix) this group is not included in the subsequent analyses.
5. In the Netherlands almost 60% of all schools are state-funded, religiously affiliated schools. Due
to this majority position, religiously affiliated schools in the Netherlands harbor a lot of pupils with no
religious background and parents usually do not have a religious motivation for sending their children
to a religiously affiliated school. In case of the Netherlands, it thus makes sense to explicitly ask if the
respondents were sent to a religiously affiliated school for religious reasons as an indicator of their
religious upbringing.
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APPENDIX
Table 4. Descriptive statistics
Min. Max. Mean SD
Attitude towards income differences 0.00 5.00 0.86 1.71
Attitude towards freedom of speech 0.00 4.00 0.80 1.25
Attitude towards pro-life issues 0.00 5.00 1.47 1.45
Attitude towards homosexual relationships 0.00 5.00 2.52 1.35
Religious affiliation
Non-church member 0.00 1.00 0.24
Catholic 0.00 1.00 0.06
Orthodox Protestant 0.00 1.00 0.01
Mainline Protestant 0.00 1.00 0.04
Evangelical 0.00 1.00 0.58
Raised in religious way 1.00 5.00 2.72 1.33
Religious education important 1.00 5.00 3.07 1.52
Juvenile church attendance resp. 1.00 4.00 2.90 1.34
Church att. father resp. 12–15 yr. 1.00 4.00 3.07 1.33
Church att. mother resp. 12–15 yr. 1.00 4.00 3.16 1.27
Prayer at home 1.00 7.00 4.58 2.76
Bible reading at home 1.00 7.00 3.37 2.53
Parents evang. resp. 12–15 yr. 0.00 1.00 0.16
Sent to religious school 0.00 1.00 0.43
Bible literal word of God 0.00 1.00 0.22
Mono-religious orientation 1.00 5.00 3.54 1.38
Reads Christ. newspaper 0.00 1.00 0.14
Member evangelical broadcasting corp. 0.00 1.00 0.33
Employment status (has a paid job) 0.00 1.00 0.68
Income
Lower income 0.00 1.00 0.19
Middle income 0.00 1.00 0.12
Higher income 0.00 1.00 0.40
Education
Lower education 0.00 1.00 0.07
Middle education 0.00 1.00 0.36
Higher education 0.00 1.00 0.54
Gender (female) 0.00 1.00 0.54
Age 18 94 49.60 13.75
Marital status
Married 0.00 1.00 0.73
Single 0.00 1.00 0.13
Living together 0.00 1.00 0.04
Widow/widower 0.00 1.00 0.03
Divorced 0.00 1.00 0.05
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